According to Orthodox Four-Dimensionalism, ordinary objects are extended in time in much the same way in which they are extended in space, and thus have temporal parts as well as spatial parts. Ordinary objects are thus, according to orthodox four-dimensionalism, what I will call a temporal whole. This paper rejects orthodox four-dimensionalism. It proceeds, however, by granting much of what the four-dimensionalist holds. What I argue against is the supposition that, granting the existence of these purported temporal parts, we have reason to believe that there are temporal wholes, entities that are the mereological sums of the purported temporal parts. I argue that given what seems to me the most plausible answer to Peter van Inwagen’s Special Composition Question, there is no reason to believe in temporal wholes, and thus in orthodox four-dimensionalism. The motivation for the particular answer to SCQ that I pursue involves adopting a constituent ontology.