Epistemic altruists like David Christensen argue rationally determining what to believe involves averaging my interpretation of the evidence with those of a set of my fellow agents, e.g. my epistemic peers. I argue, among theories of rationality, epistemic altruism is the analog of normative consequentialism in ethics. Both views consist in an objective element that specifies a range of options and a subjective element ranking those options. Since epistemic altruism shares consequentialism’s structure, it also inherits its faults. Like consequentialism, altruism ignores the authority of the personal perspective. Altruists insist I’m permitted to maintain controversial beliefs only if I have an impartial argument privileging my judgment over my dissenters’ judgments. Relying on Bernard Williams, I argue agents maintaining their beliefs from such an argument do so motivated by one thought too many. Furthermore, I argue epistemic altruism delivers counterintuitive results even in the simple cases Christensen uses to motivate it.