Analytic Explanation:

Analysis: composition, or constitution.

Notice you can't have redundant epicycles in, say, a dictionary definition -- whereas you can in a Turk-type chess-player.  
Note also: circular definition is useless, but not false; just like a T-sentence where the object- and meta-language are both English.  (And note use of phrase “circular” for circular definitions – we also talk about circular arguments, which are likewise perfectly valid, but not convincing.)

Consider why reference can't be circular (Kripke);
Ryle's (?) argument about unpacking names
GNU = GNU's not Unix

Dictionary definitions of words explain in this way, by providing a (semantic) analysis of the target concept (explanandum) into other concepts that are part of the explanatory base.  (“Explaining the meaning of a term” is explanation, despite what I previously thought: it’s analytic explanation.  NB: explaining the meaning is never really an explanation “Why?” or “How?”, so those seem to be just grammatical heuristics; explaining the meaning is explaining “What X means”.) Now perhaps I don’t know one of the base concepts – then I could ask what that means in turn.  But that’s nothing special: event X could explain event E (be the cause of E), but then I could turn around and ask what caused X.

[And then stuff on epistemic base, from blue notebook.]

(Now, how does favoring fit in with analytic explanations – particularly with “explaining the meaning of  term/phrase X”?  Do other analytic explanations – such as explaining How a system does Y – really involve favoring? Explaining how the system can do Y fits in with favoring: capability of doing the component activities in doing Y guarantees capability of doing Y.  (This appeals to actual, or theoretically premised possible, doings of Y.)  But perhaps a question like “What is it to do Y?” doesn’t seek favoring.  Of course this almost sounds like conceptual analysis.  If conceptual analysis is tied to a particular language (as I think Larson, and maybe Stalnaker hold) then it’s almost a ‘legalistic’ question: within the standards of this accepted framework, what does this mean?  What must this mean, within the accepted language.

If there is non-favoring, analytical explanation, could this be what Salmon is after in his non-favoring examples?  (Note how Jeffrey, 1971 separates knowing why from knowing that/how in stochastic cases.  And hey! – if, as I suggested above, Salmon’s “result of a random process” is really a case of constitution, then a “How?” question would be appropriate; maybe this is what Jeffrey was intuitively picking up.)  The breakdown of the uranium atom seems pretty different from analysis of meaning in definitions.  Still, I take a process – decay of the atom – and simply illustrate the component parts.  (Or rather: being uncaused, the decay fits the definition of a random process – it constitutes a random process.  Constitution is fitting a standard – e.g., a definition)

[Note that Cummins focuses primarily on properties -- cogsci explanations are property explanations.  He seems to neglect analysis of objects.  This might be important: theories analyze objects, at least as much as dispositions.  Analytic explanations -- cogsci explanations -- could explain by analyzing objects.]                            

Analyzing an object or activity into several constituent parts is decomposition; whereas analysis into a single 'lower-level' part is localization.

In the case of Cummins’ problematic Rule A2, I distinguish between two different ways of explaining a property/capacity analytically: explaining it through property analysis (analyzing the target property into ‘component’ properties); and explaining it through component analysis (the components, in this case, of the system exhibiting the property – note there can be component analysis of objects or of process; “component” here meaning spatio-temporal part).  The former involves unpacking the target property into constituent (not component!) properties (and these need not be extended over S-T), and the latter involves finding the property in one of the (smaller S-T) components of the possessing system.  The former I’ll call “decomposition” of the property, the latter “localization” of the property.  My criticism (properly stated) was: Cummins’ A2 – as a constraint against analytically explaining a property instance P1 by appeal to (inter alia) another instance P2 of the same property – only holds for decomposition, not for localization.

Note (i) that this same constraint applies to definitional analysis of properties: you can’t explain the meaning of  P by appeal to (inter alia) P.  There ‘isn’t any room’ for another instance of P within the ‘bigger’ target concept P – there’s no possibility of midgets within chess-playing machines here.  And so (ii) the two cases – definitional analysis of a concept, and decomposition of a property – seem suspiciously similar.  “What it is (in general) to do X, or to be Y” is a general analysis, not an analysis of a particular system’s Xing or being Y – a general analysis like definitional analysis. (And neither use favoring.)  What it is for this substance to be water – being HOH – is just what it is for anything to be water.  What it is to add is just to ‘map’ two arguments onto one value, following the traditional mathematical constraints for addition (0 as identity element, commutativity, etc.).  That's very different from stating how this system S adds.  The former two cases (definitional analysis and general property decomposition)  are both unpacking “definitions” – definition according to physics or mathematics in the former case, definitions according to linguistic standards in the latter.  So maybe we can reduce the two cases into one in this way (“definition” modulo the designated background theory/standards).  But they both seem to escape favoring, and so my otherwise general account of explanations.  And note that this type of explanation is exactly the kind that doesn’t fit into “Why?” and “How?” questions.  If I can clearly segregate these ‘general analysis’ explanations off from the rest, then I’ll have an explanation as to why they don’t answer “Why?” and “How?” questions.  At a minimum, it’s a nice grammatical dividing line.  I need to solve this!

“What counts as Y-ing” vs. How does S (manage to) Y?  General analyses use the former type Q, but not the latter.

How does John count as a good father?
What counts as a compact car?
What counts as/constitutes an excusable absence.

Here asking for general analysis, according to some accepted background set of standards: general standards for being a good father; legal standards of being a compact car; standards for excusable absence in, say, a given class.  These are practically value/legal questions.  And again, we’re unpacking a concept modulo a definiton or principle.

Look up Churchland citation on moral explanation; it seems like it too would fall under this model of general analysis. [Sturgeon]

(Possibly related: do we want to count the part’s capacity to X as the same instance of the capacity as the whole system’s capacity to X?  In your argument against Cummins you assume not: localization is explanation, even though it appeals to another instance of the very same capacity.  If you’re right about that, does it have something to do with mereological relations?  For ex: we don’t talk about my ability to pump blood, but rather my heart’s ability.  Conversely, the designated module could lose an ability, without the whole system losing it.  (Ex: Nabakov’s language organ lost the capacity to learn language, but not all of Nabakov – he used some other mental organ, like general intelligence, to learn English the hard way.  [But do we mean “capacity to learn just from everyday exposure,” or capacity to learn at all?  Still, when we explain a child’s ability to learn English at all, we appeal to the language organ – it is in fact what the child uses.   When we explain Nabakov’s ability to learn English, we do appeal to a different mental organ(s).  It does some work in explanation, after all: why did Nabakov take so much longer to learn English?  Because he learned with general intelligence, rather than with the language organ.  (But note that here we’re explaining a process, not a capacity; this example looks fishy.  Perhaps “How is Nabakov able to speak English?” – the answer would be different than when asking “How does a normal 8-year-old American speak English?”  Whatever question is a good analytic one, we would appeal to different localizations in the two cases.)]  Likewise in recovered stroke patients, who use some different parts of the brain when exhibiting the same old (type of ) ability they had before the stroke.)

Also: look at Cummin’s examples of property explanations: are they really process explanations, like the possibly-crummy question “Why did Nabakov take so much longer to learn English?” example.  If they are appeals to S-T extended processes, then there’s your distinction bet. general analyses and particular ones.  I dunno.

Applications:

Emergence is  supervenience without analysis?

The disagreement between mentalists and philosophical behaviorists is  a disagreement over whether characteristic behavior constitutes the mental state, or is caused/causes by it.

"It's bad luck to get shot twice in one day."
What's funny about this?  Usually when we say something is bad luck (like breaking a mirror, or having a black cat cross one's path) , we mean that sort of event causes bad luck.  (Breaking a mirror is not especially bad in itself; it's supposed to bring about later bad events.)  But getting shot in one day rather constitutes bad luck.  (Compare this to Salmon: “The atomic decay was a result of a random process.”  No, the atomic decay, precisely because it was uncaused, constitutes a random process.)

General vs. Particular Analyses:

General Analysis:
"that's all there is to (being an) X"
(Being an) X is just (being) Y.

A: Have you ever gone all the way?
B: No.  I've had sexual intercourse, but I've never gone all the way.
A: That's all there is to going all the way.  Going all the way is just having sexual intercourse.

Being a bachelor is just being an unmarried male.
[PRO being a bachelor] is just [PRO being an unmarried male].
*All there is to being an unmarried male is being a bachelor.
[A bachelor] is (just) [an unmarried male].
Being an unmarried male makes you/one/a person a bachelor.
(What makes that a crime?
What makes that important?)

Particular analysis:
His table is just a packing crate.
*All there is to being his table is being a packing crate.
?All there is to his table is a packing crate.
His table is just a packing crate.
*[Being his table] is (just) [PRO being a packing crate].
*Being his table] makes one/ a thing a packing crate. (This is like a backtracking counterfactual) 
(Moral: can’t use the “being X” locution for particular analyses – unless the particular analysis is just an instantiation of a general analysis.)

Notice: you can't have redundant epicycles in, say, a dictionary definition – which would count as a general analysis.  But you perfectly well can in (object-) analysis of an individual. (Ex: Turk-style midget in chess ‘computer’) 

Q: can there even be object-analysis of a general type of object.  Hmm, I don’t see why not – as long as every instance of that type has the same part structure.  The alternative is multiple instantiability, where there is no one uniform analysis of every object.  (Not the only examples of mult. instant., of course.)  

Hmm, is that correct – that multiply instantiable objects-types have no general (component) analysis?  Why not?  What about a chess set, for example?  There are two different families of objects; each family has one king, one queen, etc.  Each object is defined in terms of its behavior/relations in the system.  But still chess sets are multiply instantiable.  It seems instead that multiply-instantiable object-types can be analyzed without having to state the physical composition anywhere in the analysis.  A non-multiply-instantiable object-type would essentially involve referring to physical structure/objects in the analysis.

I could give an analysis of something – e.g., water – without appealing to its ultimate physical constituents; I could describe its phenomenal qualities, characteristic features; but it’s only from ignorance that I don’t mention HOH in giving a proper scientific analysis of water.  That is the proper analysis of water.  But 

Semantic (Definitional) Analysis:
(from blue notebook)

Different purposes of a definition:

(1) If I don’t know the meaning of a word, giving me a synonymous word will satisfy me – i.e., telling me that “rational” means, e.g., “reasonable”.

(2)But if we’re, e.g., arguing over the nature of rationality in a philosophical discussion, I won’t accept “reasonable” as an account of what it is to be “rational”.  Here I’m searching for something like ‘verificationist’ criteria for rationality – I nned to ‘unpack’ (analyze) “rationality” into more than one other concept.  

It seems to be a question of what’s accepted: in (i) “reasonable” is accepted, unquestioned, as a given concept, and hence “rational” can be defined in ‘acceptable’ terms.  But in (ii) the point is that, yes, the two words are synonymous, but neither is clearly acceptable – neither is justifiable to use.  How do we justify it (/them)?  By giving epistemic criteria – criteria in terms that are ‘uncontroversial’ – the fit the bulk of our judgments about “rationality”.  

Could it be that in the first case, any word I already know (in some definite, unequivocal sense) is automatically acceptable?  And what counts as acceptable in (ii), where I’m looking for a theory of rationality?

Analytic Explanation and Linguisitics:

Synchronic nature of analytic explanation can be used to explicate the true nature of pseudo-process lingo in generative syntax.  NP-Movement isn't a real process, because the relation of D-Structure to S-Structure is synchronic.

Come up with explanations in Linguistics to flesh this out.

Binding Theory: ungrammaticality of NP-trace as subject of tensed subordinate IP.  

Difference between PRO and NP- or WH-trace: PRO is base-generated, i.e., not the result of movement,  i.e., a null NP present at D-structure.

Subjacency, a constraint on WH-Movement: i.e., a constraint on the relation between WH-traces and WH-phrases  at S-Structure and LF.