Van Inwagen (1994) argues against the thesis that 
composition is identity (CI) by appealing to count 
statements. He argues that singular existential 
statements, which quantify over objects in our 
ontology, together with the relevant non-identity 
statements, show that CI is false. Moreover, van 
Inwagen argues that a CI theorist cannot even 
coherently state her position. In this paper, I 
defend the CI theorist against both of these charges. 
I propose a new way of counting—Plural Counting—that 
utilizes a plural logic, which importantly includes 
plural terms and quantifiers and a plural/singular 
hybrid identity predicate. Adopting Plural Counting, 
I argue, will allow the CI theorist to plausibly and 
coherently state her view, as well as avoid van 
Inwagen’s counting objection.