Perhaps the main reply to the argument for the incompatibility 
of divine foreknowledge and human freedom is ‘Ockhamism’. 
Ockhamists distinguish between certain sorts of facts about 
the past: ‘hard facts’ and ‘soft facts’. According to the 
Ockhamist, once we see that God’s past beliefs about our future 
free decisions are merely ‘soft’ facts about the past, no threat 
remains to freedom. Though a substantial literature arose in 
connection with this distinction, it remains notoriously vexed. 
It is time, I believe, to revisit these issues. I argue that the 
attempts to analyze the hard/soft fact distinction got off on 
fundamentally the wrong track. The centrally important feature 
of soft facts is that they (in some sense) depend on the future. 
I argue that the literature on the distinction has failed to 
capture the sense of dependence at stake, and gesture towards 
what an adequate account will really look like.