According to Orthodox Four-Dimensionalism, 
ordinary objects are extended in time in 
much the same way in which they are extended 
in space, and thus have temporal parts as 
well as spatial parts.  Ordinary objects are 
thus, according to orthodox four-dimensionalism, 
what I will call a temporal whole.  This paper 
rejects orthodox four-dimensionalism.  It 
proceeds, however, by granting much of what the 
four-dimensionalist holds. What I argue against 
is the supposition that, granting the existence 
of these purported temporal parts, we have 
reason to believe that there are temporal wholes, 
entities that are the mereological sums of the 
purported temporal parts.  I argue that given 
what seems to me the most plausible answer to 
Peter van Inwagen’s Special Composition Question, 
there is no reason to believe in temporal wholes, 
and thus in orthodox four-dimensionalism. The 
motivation for the particular answer to SCQ that 
I pursue involves adopting a constituent ontology.