"In the debate between compatibilism and 
incompatibilism concerning determinism and
responsibility, there is an alternative 
version of compatibilism that has not 
received much
attention. This defense 
proposes that there are two somewhat 
distinct ways of successfully 
conceptualizing the world of human 
behavior: the “scientific” cause-and-effect 
way, and the
“informal agential” way that 
centers on agents and their rationales. 
The paper explores the
possibility that 
if determinism is true in the world as 
described by the first scheme, that may 
not
imply that it is true of the world as 
conceived in the second scheme. It all 
depends on how the two schemes relate to 
each other. If the agential world 
supervenes on the “scientific” world, 
determinism in the latter will produce 
determinism in the former. But if the 
agential world only
emerges from the 
“scientific” world, there is no such 
implication, and compatibilism wins."