Epistemic altruists like David Christensen argue 
rationally determining what to believe involves 
averaging my interpretation of the evidence with 
those of a set of my fellow agents, e.g. my 
epistemic peers.  I argue, among theories of 
rationality, epistemic altruism is the analog of 
normative consequentialism in ethics.  Both views 
consist in an objective element that specifies a 
range of options and a subjective element ranking 
those options.  Since epistemic altruism shares 
consequentialism’s structure, it also inherits its 
faults.  Like consequentialism, altruism ignores 
the authority of the personal perspective.  
Altruists insist I’m permitted to maintain 
controversial beliefs only if I have an impartial 
argument privileging my judgment over my dissenters’ 
judgments.  Relying on Bernard Williams, I argue 
agents maintaining their beliefs from such an 
argument do so motivated by one thought too many.  
Furthermore, I argue epistemic altruism delivers 
counterintuitive results even in the simple cases 
Christensen uses to motivate it.