In “The Reasons of a Living Being,” Allan Gibbard 
argues for the claim that moral judgments simply 
express states of planning. In this paper, I will 
evaluate Gibbard’s planning expressivism based on 
the examples that he gives his paper. I will argue 
that Gibbard does not provide us with enough reason 
to favor his plan-based expressivism over one that 
focuses on emotions or attitudes. I will justify my 
argument by demonstrating a shortcoming of Gibbard’s 
theory as it is laid out in his paper. This 
shortcoming has to do with why we plan as we do and 
whether Gibbard’s theory is any more explanatory than 
previous versions of expressivism. From my argument, 
it can be concluded that Gibbard has more work to do 
in explaining why we should accept his theory and move 
beyond classical expressivism to plan-based expressivism.