Emotivism is the view that to make a moral judgment—to 
think, for example, that an action is morally right or 
morally wrong—is not to believe that something is the 
case but is instead to have a kind of desire. Emotivism’s 
appeal consists in the thought that it accounts for the 
“essentially practical” nature of moral judgment. However, 
even theorists impressed by the practical aspects of moral 
thought acknowledge that moral judgments seem to share 
features with paradigmatic beliefs. Moral judgments seem, 
for instance, to stand in logical relations. This has been 
thought by many to pose a problem for emotivism, since 
desires do not appear to be the sort of thing that can stand 
in logical relations. Furthermore, all of the standard 
solutions to this problem face serious objections. In a 
recent paper, Gunnar Björnsson offers a new solution to this 
problem. I argue here that Björnsson’s attempted solution fails.