"Recently, two distinguished physicists have 
claimed that they can prove what they call the 
“Free Will Theorem”: given some seemingly 
uncontroversial axioms, the response of a 
particle to a particular experimentalsetting 
is free. Is this theorem the result of some 
mathematical mistake? Is it the consequence of 
some unphysical axioms? Or is it a new powerful 
tool for the libertarian to show that in our 
world there is room for free will? In this paper 
I analyze the implications of this theorem for 
the free will debate. My conclusion is that 
there aren't any. In fact, even assuming that 
the theorem is a valid deduction and thatfree 
will is equivalent what they define it to be 
(both of which are at best controversial), the 
theorem completely begs the question: only if 
free will is already assumed for people, it could 
be established for
particles (whatever that could 
mean)."